Inquiry says an electrical fault in an AC supply cable was the most probable ignition source, while fire-safety failures compounded the tragedy.
WEB DESK: A comprehensive inquiry into the deadly fire at the Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences (PIMS) has found that the tragedy resulted from systematic and institutional failures, while identifying an electrical fault in the supply cable of an air-conditioning unit as the most probable source of ignition.
The fire killed 14 newborns at the PIMS nursery in Islamabad on August 26, 2026.
According to the inquiry report, the fire became visible at about 6:38am and dense smoke engulfed the nursery within one to two minutes, leaving an exceptionally narrow window for rescue.
Electrical fault identified as most probable ignition source
The committee concluded that abnormal localised electrical heating in the supply cable of AC Unit No. 2 was the most probable mechanism that started the fire.
However, investigators said the precise electrical defect and the individual duty holder responsible for it still needed to be established.
The report ruled out several other possible causes, saying there was no evidence of arson, multiple ignition points, an external IESCO fault, a pre-fire oxygen leak, or an incubator or warmer causing the fire.
Emergency notification delay highlighted
The inquiry identified a significant gap in the emergency response timeline.
The fire became visible at around 6:38am, but the Capital Emergency Service was not notified until approximately 6:54am.
The committee described the 16-minute gap as a principal chronological concern, while noting that the emergency service itself responded within minutes after receiving the notification.
Serious fire-safety deficiencies found
The inquiry found that PIMS and its senior management bore principal institutional responsibility for failing to turn known fire-safety risks and previous warnings into an effective and verified safety system.
The nursery housed 15 non-self-evacuating newborns in a unit officially designed for 10 beds, while only two doctors and two nurses were immediately available.
The committee described the staffing situation as a serious operational mismatch.
It also found that the nursery lacked a functional automatic smoke detection and fire alarm system as well as sprinkler protection. Human observation and manual communication therefore remained the main methods of detecting and reporting a fire.
Previous warnings were not adequately addressed
The report said fire and life-safety concerns at PIMS had been identified well before the August tragedy.
These included correspondence from the Capital Development Authority, observations by the Federal Ombudsman dating back to 2015 and PIMS’s own acknowledgement in 2024 that its fire-safety infrastructure was ageing.
A fire at the PIMS Nursing Hostel on July 6, 2026, just seven weeks before the nursery tragedy, had also highlighted similar deficiencies.
According to the inquiry, those warnings and recommendations were not converted into a comprehensive, time-bound and independently verified corrective programme before the August 26 fire.
Frontline staff cleared of abandoning newborns
The committee rejected general allegations that doctors, nurses or security personnel abandoned the newborns during the emergency.
It said CCTV and other evidence showed prompt alarm raising, entry, rescue and treatment efforts by frontline personnel.
The report therefore said frontline staff should not be blamed for the institutional failures that preceded the disaster.
Criminal investigation recommended
The inquiry did not find any named individual criminally guilty at this stage.
However, it recommended focused criminal investigations into possible culpable failures involving the installation or maintenance of AC Unit No. 2, obstruction of mandatory emergency routes, failure to act on specific prior warnings and any established delay in notifying external emergency services.
The committee also recommended contractual scrutiny of Belfort Security Services and engineering contractor BE Engineers, while stressing that PIMS retained responsibility for supervision, verification and enforcement of safety requirements.
The findings shift the focus of the tragedy beyond the immediate ignition source to the wider safety systems and administrative responsibilities that were supposed to protect vulnerable newborns.
The report’s central conclusion is that while the specific AC fault may not have been foreseeable, the need for stronger fire preparedness was known in advance.
